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Abstract
This  paper  examines  the  dynamic  behawior  of  protection  and  liberalization
in  developing  countries.  Consistent  with  enpiri,cal  evidence  on  the
development  of  trade  policies,  we  model  policy  decisions  as  the  outcome  of
a  political  contest  betr^teen  import-competing  interests  and  exPorters.
Uncertainty  about  the  success  of  political  contests  yields  a  dynamic
political  equilibriurn  in  which  tariffs  gradually  increase  over  tine'
Eventually,  the  economic  costs  of  increasing  tariffs  cause  declining
profits  in  the  exports  sector  and  induce  exPorters  to  enter  the  Political
arena  and  lobby  actively  against  tariffs.  We show  that  depending  on  the
characteristics  of  the  markeL,  a  political  contest  may  generate  a
liberalization  or  a  move toward  autarky.
*Earlier 
versions  of  this  paper  were  presented  at  the  1994 International
Trade  and Finance  Association  l'leetings  and the  1,995  Western  Economic
Association  l'leetings.  We wish  Lo thank  the  participants  at  these
meetings  and,  in  particular,  Robert  E.  Bal-dwin and Arye  Hillman  for
helpful  co$nents  and suggestions.  A1l  remaining  errors  are  solely  our
responsibllity.  The views  expressed  in  this  paper  do not  necessarily
reflect  Lhose of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Dallas  or  the  Federal  Reserve
system.Building  Trade  Barriers  and  Knocklng  Them Down:
The Politlcal  Economv of  Unilateral  Trade  Libetallzations
During  the  1980s a  large  number of  deweloping  countries  began the
process  of  liberalizing  their  economies.  Argentina,  Mexico,  Turkey,  and
several  other  countries  in  Asia,  Africa,  and Lalin  America  began the
process  of  reducing  tariffs  and  eliminatlng  lmport  quotas  and  licenses.
Mexico,  for  example, began a sweeping liberalization  in  1987.  Since then,
not  only  has  Mexico  dropped  its  awerage  tariff  level  from  around  34
percent  to  4  percent,  bu!  it  also  joined  the  General  Agreement on Tarlffs
and Trade  (GATT) and the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreenent  (NAF]A).
Despite  recent  economic wolatility  in  Mexico  and other  emerging markets,
economic reforrns  are  not  being  reversed.
IJhy has  there  been  the  push  to  liberalize  and why has  lt  persisted?
One simple  answer  is  that  international  organizations-such  as  ttte  l{orld
Bank and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (TMF)-have  successfully  exerted
pressure  on countries  to  liberalize  their  econouies.  Undoubtedly,  some
countries  with  severe  balance  of  pa)nnent problems  have  been persuaded  to
liberalize  at  times  of  crisis;  but  this  rationale  cannot  explain  nost
cases.  Mexico's  recent  entry  into  NAFTA, for  example,  was not  undertaken
because  of  pressure  from  the  IMF or  the  World  Bank.  Moreover,  forei-gn
institutions  played  at  best  a modes!  role  in  initiating  recent  reforms  in
seweral  other  countries  (Rodrik  1992).
Another  possible  explanati-on  is  that  only  recently  have  developing
countries  hawe begun  to  realize  that  highly  protectionist  policies  have
not  worked  and are  just  norr beginning  to  correct  their  ways.  However,this  explanation  is  perhaps  a bit  naive.  coverunent  policlrmakers  have
been aware  of  problerns  inherent  in  irnport-substi  tution  policies  for  quite
a while.  RauI  Prebisch,  fot  example-one  of  the  main  architects  of  the
inport-substitution  indus trialization  policies  in  Latin  America-real  ized
the  problems of  highly  protectionist  policies  as early  as  1953.L
Although  there  certalnly  other  possible  explainacions  for  recent
trade  liberal  izations  ,  these  liberalizations  may not  be  a new phenomenon,
For  decades Latin  American  development  has been marked by  cycles  of
increasing  protection  and episodes of  libetalization  (Findlay  1986).
oftentimes,  liberalizations  are  inlroduced  during  a  crisis  period  when a
country  is  suffering  severe  economic  difficulties,  such  as  the  1980s debt
crisis.  But  aluost  as many liberalizations  hawe started  under  placid
conditions,  wich  no  obvious  malfunctioning  of  the  economic system
(Michaely,  Papageorgiou  and Choksi  1991).  One eleuent  couirnon  to  all  large
liberalizations,  howevef,  is  that  they  were  preceded  by  several  years  of
gradually  increasing  lewels  of  domestic  distortions.
What,  then,  explains  the  build-up  of  protection  and episodes  of
unilaceral  liberalization?  lJe knor,r  that  governments  are  often  aware of
what  policies  are  best  for  the  country  as  a whole,  hovrever-as  Stigler
(197L),  Peltznan  (1976)  and others  have  noted-goverrments  seldom pursue
poLices  designed  to  maxiuize  social  welfare.  Rather,  governments maximize
'Hirschman (1968) quotes an insightful  passage fron  Prebisch  (1953):
"As  is  well  knor,m,  the  proliferation  of  industries  of  ewery  kind  in  a
closed  market  has  deptiwed  the  Latin  Auerican  countries  of  the  advantages
of  specialization  and  economies  of  scale,  and  owing  to  the  protecti.on
afforded  by  excessive  tariff  duties  and  restrictions,  a  healthy  forln  of
internal  competition  has  failed  to  develop,  to  the  detriment  of  efficient
production.  r'their  political  support  and,  in  doing  so,  implernent policies  that  reflect
the  interests  of  the  most  powerful  and vocal  self-interest  groups,
This  paper's  contribution  is  to  enhance understanding  of  the  dlmamic
political  process behind  che decision  to  build  crade barriets  and then
knock  them down.  Although  the  rnodel specifically  addresses  trade
distortions,  it  can be applied  to  a broad class  of  econouic distortlons
and  episodes  of  economic reforrns.  We model- the  domestic  political  narket
for  protection  and liberalization  as  a  lobbying  contest  between pro-  and
anti-trade  groups.
The model  explains  a nr:mber of  styllzed  facts  in  tariff-setting
behavior  and liberalizations  .  tr'irst,  the  model  demonstrates  that  a.
goverrunent,  responding  only  to  domestic  political  pressure  groups,  will
delay  a  liberalization  until  domestic  protection  reaches  a critical  level.
Liberalizations  will  occur  only  when the  potential  gains  to  the  pro-tfade
group  (exportets)  outlreigh  the  costs  to  entering  the  political  process.
Second,  the  model  explains  the  dlmamic pattern  of  tariffs.
Protectionist  policies  are  usually  irnplemented on an  indus try-by-  indus try
basis  and  tend  to  increase  graduall-y,  while  trade  liberalizations  are
usually  implemented  at  discreLe  points  in  time  and tend  to  reduce
proteccion  across  many industries  at  once.  Such liberalizations  are  often
follo('ed  by  subsequent  pressures  that  may partially  or  completely  rewerse
the  original  liberalization  (Marvel  and Ray L983,  Ray 1987,  Michaely,
Papageorgiou  and Choksi  LggD.Z  We demonstrate  that  as  inport-competing
interests  lobby  for  higher  lewels  of  protection,  they  gain  information
-There 
are  few  explanations  of  this  cycle  of  protection  in  the
literature.  An  exception  is  Cassing,  McKeown  and  Ochs  (1986).about  the  tolerance  of  exporters.  This
equi.libriurn,  increasing  the  equilibriur
protection  rises  to  such  an extent  that
politicaL  process  and lobby  heavily,  it
liberalization.
infornation  alters  the  po l itical
tariff.  Eventually,  if  the
it  induces  exporters  to  enter  Che
can  generate  an  episode  of
The paper  is  orBanized  as  follows.  Seccion  I  sets  the  background  for
the  model  and  describes  the  industry  structure  and the  behavior  of  firms.
Section  II  describes  the  political  market  and trade  policy  contests.
Section  III  presents  the  d)manic  political  process  that  deternines
tariffs.  Section  IV  concludes  with  some brief  renarks.
I.  Industry  Structure  and the  Behavtor  of  Flrms
T'tris section  considers  an economy consisting  of  thro sectors-an
inport-compet  ing  sector  and an exporting  sector-there  is  imperfect
competition  between  firms.  An import  tarlff  increases  the  profits  of
firrns  in  the  import-competing  sector  at  the  expense of  profits  in  the
1
exporting  sector.-  Within  each  sector  there  exists  a  large  mrmber of
industries  which  have  the  same duopolistic  structure.  trJithin  an
iuport-competing  industry,  a  single  domestic  firn  competes in  the  domestic
market  ttith  a  single  foreign  rival,  while  ltithin  an exporting  industry,  a
single  domestic  firrn  competes in  the  foreign  narket  with  a  single  foreign
-Another 
economic  model  that  yields  this  result  is  the  specific  factors
model  (see  Jones  L971,  ltiayer  L974  and  Mussa  1974).  In  that  model
the  real  returlr  to  the  fixed  factor  in  the  import-competing  sector
increases  as  a  result  of  an  inport  tariff,  while  the  teal  return  to  the
fixed  factor  in  the  exporting  sector  falls.  See  Hillman  (1982)  and  Mayer
(1984)  for  uses  of  the  specific  factors  rnodel  in  explaining  the  structure
of  Drotection.firrn.  A  comron tariff  on all  imports  gives  firms  in  the  import-competing
sector  an advantage  over  their  foreign  cox0petitors  which  increases  output
and profits  in  the  sector.  This  advantage  creates  an  interest  group  in
favor  of  the  tariff.  Howewer, the  resul,taDt  increase  in  the  deroand  for
labor  increases  wages and production  costs  in  the  exporting  sector.  This
increase  places  firms  in  this  sector  au a  disadvantage  compared with  their
foreign  competitors,  which  creates  an  interest  group  countering  the
pro-tariff  forces.
The  Import-Competing  Sector
The import-conpetlng  sector  consists  of  m identical  industrles.  In
each  industry  there  are  two  firns,  a  domestic  firm  and a  foreign  rlval
firn,  producing  a homogeneous good solely  for  sale  on  the  domestic  narket.
The  rnarket  inverse  denand  function  for  a  typical  industry  in  the
inport-competing  sector  is  given  by  P (X.)  (i:1,  .,  m),  where
X  -x  +x (1)
is  the  total  supply  to  the  market;  x,  is  the  output  of  the  domestic  firrn
in  industry  i;  and x*  is  the  output  of  ,t"  tot.i-gn  flrru  in  lndustry  i.
The denand function  l-s downward-sloping  and linear,  so  P (.)  (  0  and
tt  L
P  (.)  -  0.-
-This 
ma.rket structure  is  slnilar  to  that  used by  Hillnan  and Ursprung
(1988)  t^tho  anaLyze the  political  choice  between  tariffs  and voluntary
export  restraints.  Gould  and Woodbridge  (1995)  use  a  sinilar  econornic
model  to  explain  tariff  forroation  and episodes  of  trade  liberalizations
under  threats  of  retaliation  from  a  trading  partner.Both  firns  use  the  same production  technology  which  is  linear  in  the
single  inpuc  (labor).  The  cost  functions  of  the  two  firms  are  given  by
C(x.  )  -  (wo)x,
and
c"(x")  :  (w"@)x*
n*.:IP*(x.)-wa]x.
and
n".  -  [P*(X!)  -  t*,  -  w"c]x"
where  a  is  the  units  of  labot  required  to  produce  one unit  of  the  good;  w
is  the  domestle  wage rate;  and w'  is  the  foreign  wage race.
The foreign  firrn  faces  a  specific  tariff  txr  when importing  to  the
country.  - 
The profit  functions  of  a  typical  domestic  ix0port-competing
firrn  and  foreign  rival  firn  are  glwen by
(3)
(4)
The firms  engage in  a  one-shot  Cournot  game-they  simultaneously
announce quantities  and prices  adjust  to  clear  the  market.  Because there
are  many firms  within  both  sectors,  each  firn  treats  the  wage as  fixed  and
selects  a  quantity  to  maximize  profits  given  the  quantity  chosen by  its
competitor.  Setuing  Lhe pereeived  roarginal  profit  of  the  domestic  firm
and  the  foreign  firrn  equal  to  zexo  yields  the  reaction  functions
"Later  we  discuss  the  impact  of  an  increase  in  a  common tariff  (t  :  t  -
for  all  i)  on  profits  and  output.Given  the  assunption  of  constant  costs  and linear  demand funetions,
there  exists  a unique  Cournot  equilibrium.6  The equilibrium  output  and
profit  levels  of  the  two  firms  are  functions  of  the  tariff  and wage rates
in  the  two  countries,  For  ttte  foreign  firn,  the  tariff  is  a  constant  per
unit  cost  of  access  to  the  domestic  market  and hence has  the  saDe impact
on profits  as  an  increase  in  the  marginal  cost  of  production.  If  the
specific  lariff  exceeds a certain  level  l*  (the  prohibitive  tariff),  it
will  be  unprofi-table  for  the  foreign  firn  to  produce  any quantity  of  the
good.  If  the  tariff  equals  or  exceeds  the  prohibitiwe  level,  the  domestic
inport-competing  firn  earns  monopoly profits.
Totally  differentiatlng  the  reaction  functions  (6)  and  (7)  and
solving  the  equations  gives  the  impact  of  an  increase  in  the  lndustry's
tariff  on  the  tno  firm's  outDut  levels
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Shapiro  (1984) or  Dixit  (1986)  for  a discussion  of  the  conditions
for  the  existence  and uniqueness  of  the  eouiLibrillm.first-order  conditions  giwes
dII  /dL  :  P (X )x  (dx*/dr  )  > o
xl  xi  x  i'  I'  i'  xl'
and
an".7at, :  p'(x.  )x*(dx.,/dt  .; - *'<  o  (11)
xI  x!  x'I'  L'
Not  surprisingly,  an increase  in  the  tariff  inereases  the  output  and
profit  of  the  domestic  firm  at  the  expense of  the  foreign  rival.
Furthermore,  ic  is  easy  to  show that  d2llxr/dt2,  )  0  and d2rl"r/dt2r  >  0.7
The  Export  illg  Sector
The other  n  firms  in  the  horne  country  produce  solely  for  export,.  In
each exporting  industry  a  single  domestic  firm  exports  its  entire  produce
to  a  foreign  market  and competes in  that  market  with  a  single  foreign
firn.  The  inverse  demand function  in  the  foreign  market  for  a  typical
exporting  lndustry  is  denored by  p"(y,)  (j:1  ,  .,  n)  where
Y  *w  +w
JJ] (tz)
is  the  tocal  supply  to  the  rnarket,  y,  is  the  exports  of  the  domestic  firm
in  industry  j  and  y"  is  the  output  of  the  foreign  firm  in  industry  j.
Again  the  demand  function  is  dort'nward-s  Iop  ing  and  linear.  As  in  the
import-competing  sector,  the  finns  use  identical  single-factor  constant
returns  co  scale  production  technology.  The  profit  functions  of  the  two




this,  one must recognize  xhax dzx./dtt:  d'**.7dt' -  O.n  -  P*(Y  )v  -  (wd)y
vj  v-J 
-j  - j (13)
and
n"  :  p"(Y )v" -(w.d)v"
vj  v  l'"J  "J
(  14)
where  B  is  the  units  of  labor  required  to  produce  one  unit  of  the  good.
It  is  assuned  that  access  to  the  foteign  market  is  not  impeded  by
protection.  What  is  important,  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  is  the
manner  in  which  profits  of  the  domestic  exporting  firrn  are  affected  by
changes  in  the  domestic  wage  rate,  Qualitatively,  an  increase  in  the  cost
of  production,  via  an  increase  in  the  wage  rate,  has  the  sarne impac!  on
the  profits  of  the  domestic  exporting  firm  as  an  increase  in  the  tariff
has  on  the  profits  of  the  foreign  exporting  firns.  An  increase  in  the
wage  rate  reduces  the  competiti-weness  of  the  exporting  firn  reducing
profits  at  a  d.ecreasing  rate  (i.e.,  dfly-/dw (  0  and  d2llyj/dr,r2  >  O).
The Domestic  Laboi  Markec
The labor  rnarket  is  perfectly  compelitive.  Each of  the  nany  (m +  n)
firns  act  as  if  the  wage is  independent  of  their  output  level.  The
economy-wide demand for  labor  is
-d
L:  )  L  +  )L - 
xi,  -  vi
demand for  labor  of  firm  i  in  the
is  the  demand for  labor  by  firn  j
firms  in  each  sector  are  the  same
(rs)
import-competing
in  che exporting  sector.
where  L  is  the
sector;  and  L
v7
As  the  domesticLd:  n(cx.)  + n(pyj) (16)
The  wage  is  flexible  and  adjusts  to  clear  the  labor  market  so  that
m(ox_)  + n(pyj):  L' (17)
where  L-  is  the  fixed  Iabor  supply.
Now consider  the  impact  of  an  increase  in  the  cotrmon  tariff  ("*  - 
"*,
for  all  i)  on  the  denand for  labor  and wages.  By totally  differentlating




2^otp'"  +  2.,'12p'*
r,rhich  is  greater  than  zero,
The  Coanon  Tariff  and  Profits
Consider  the  impact  of  an  increase  in  the  coumon  tariff  lewel  on  the
profits  of  domestic  firns.  As  shown  abowe,  the  tariff  will  increase  wages
and  hence  the  cost  of  production  in  both  sectors.  In  the  import-conpeting
sector,  this  increase  will  be  nore  than  offset  by  the  direct  advanuage
provided  by  the  tariff  itself.  In  the  exporting  sector,  however,  there  is
no  compensating  effect  of  the  tariff.
Differentiating  the  profit  function  of  a  typical  inport-coupeting
firm  with  respect  to  t--,  and  using  the  first-order  condition  (6)  gives
10dII  /dt  :  P (x  )x  (dx./dc  )
Llix
+  P' (x.)x,  (  dx"/dw) (dwldr*)  -  axldwldr"  (19)
The firsc  line  of  the  expression  captures  the  direct  posLtive  effect
the  tariff  has  on  the  firm's  profits,  while  the  second part  captures  the
indirect  negative  impact  on profits  of  the  increase  in  the  donestic  lrage
resulting  from  the  tariff.  It  is  easy  to  show that
^  2  _', tmd  E
dII  ./dx  :  (2/3)x.lr  -




which  is  positive,  indicating  that  the  direct  effect  the  tariff  has  on
profits  outweighs  the  indirect  effect  of  the  increase  in  the  rrage.
The  inpact  of  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  Ehe  profits  of  firms  in
the  exporting  sector  is  given  by
d":/dt"  :  Py(Yr)y. (dy.  /dw) (dw/dx*)  -  py 
r(dw/dx*)  , (2L)
which  is  negative.  Furthermore,  both  d2fl ./d,x2  and. dzfi ./dtz  are
xvJ
positiwe.  The  profits  of  the  firms  as  a  function  of  the  tariff  are
e
displayed  in  Figure  1."
"The profit  function  is  drarim assuming II  )  for  all  t  €  [0,;  ]. yJ*
(20)
L1II.  The  Political  Model- and  Tariff  Policy  Conrests
Because  tariffs  are  usually  determined  in  a  domestic  political
market,  we  model  protection  as  the  outcome  of  a  lobbying  contest  between
the  domestic  import-competing  and  exporting  firms.  Politicians  in  the
central  government  determine  policy  on  a  range  of  issues,  most  of  lrhich  do
not  affect  the  profits  of  firms  in  either  sector.  Holrever,  they  sometimes
decide  i-ssues related  to  trade  policy.  These  policles  are  made by
majority  rule  within  the  government  -  Political  members  of  the  governnent
do  not  have  a  predetermined  stance  on  any  policy.  Rather,  they  determine
their  policy  positions  based  on  the  lobbying  of  special  interest  groups.9
The  politicians  use  these  lobbylng  resources  to  sway  voters,  who  are
imperfectly  informed.  The politician's  sol-e objective  is  to  be  reelected.
Because  the  expected  profits  of  the  inport-competing  firms  and  the
exporting  firms  vary  with  the  douestic  tariff,  firms  hawe  the  incentive  to
allocate  expenditure's  to  lobby  policJmakers.  The  outcoDe  of  the  lobbying
contest  is  uncertain  and  depends  upon  the  relative  lobbylng  expenditures
of  the  interest  groups  for  and  against  the  poticy.  The  probability  thar




assumption is  not  vital.  It  could be that  politlclans  represent  a
particular  constituency,  and hence have  a  predetermined  policy  position,
but  the  extent  to  which  chey  promote  that  policy  stance  in  the  government
depends upon  the  pressure  placed  upon then  by  their  coustituents.  This,
in  turn,  is  determlned  by  the  lobbying  activity  of  the  constituency.





in  the  import-compe  ting  sector  and  t"  :  I  S"j  *h"."  Syl  is  the  lobbying
j _1
expenditure  of  a typical  firn  in  the  exporting 
"".tot.10
To pool  their  funds  into  the  lobbying  contest,  firms  form  lobby
11
groups."  These  lobby  groups  coLlect  contributions  from  their  meubers  and.
lobby  politicians.  The  fornation  of  lobby  groups,  however,  !s  not  a
costless  endeavor.  There  are  costs  to  organizing  the  group,  collecting
Iobbying  contributions,  rnaking  contact  with  poLiticians,  etc.  (Olson  1965,
pp.10-11).  These  expenses  are  fixed  costs  of  entry  into  the
policy-forrning  contest.  If  these  costs  are  high  relative  to  the  potenLial
gains  of  contesting  the  policy,  we  may observe  one  or  both  groups  deciding
not  co  enter  the  political  process.  In  other  words,  policies  may be
uncontested  by  lobby  groups  in  sone  cases.
Deter&ination  of  the  Tariff  Platforms  and  Lobbying  Expenditures  in  the
Event  of  a  Policy  Contest
Firms  face  a  sequential  decision-making  process.  First,  firms  must
decide  whether  to  incur  the  fixed  costs  of  entering  the  political  process.
looah.t 
characterizations  of  tariff-setting  behavior  in  a  representative
dernocracy  have  been  described  in  the  literature.  Findlay  and  Wellisz
(1982)  specify  the  tariff  as  a  function  of  the  lobbying  inputs  of  pro-  and
anti-trade  interests.  Young  and  Magee  (1985)  and  Hilluan  and  Ursprung
(1988)  rnodel  tariff  foruation  as  the  outcome  of  an  electoral-  contest
between  two  political  parties  who  design  their  tariff  platforms  to
maximize  their  chances  of  electoral  success.  The  probability  of  electoral
success  depends,  at  least  in  part,  upon  the  campaign  contributi.ons  of  pro-
and  anti-trade  interest  groups.  Without  explicitty  modeling  the  behavior
of  ttre  politicians,  this  paper  determlnes  the  tariff  similarly  to  Hillman
and Ursprung's  method.
11w. 
oft.t  observe  ind.us try  associations  playing  the  role  of  these  lobby
grouPs.
llSecond,  if  they  decide  to  enter,  they  xlust  determine  their  desired  tariff
and  their  lobbying  expenditures.
Initially  as  sume that  firms  in  both  sectors  decide  to  contest  the
tariff  policy.  In  this  case  the  fixed  costs  are  sunk  and hence  can be
ignored  in  determining  firns'  profit-maximiz  ing  desired  tariffs  and
lobbying  expenditures.  Once the  firrns  in  both  sectors  have  decided  to
contest  the  tariff  policy,  they  play  the  following  two-stage  game.  In  the
first  stage  the  inport-conpeting  firros  and  the  exporting  firms
sinultaneously  announce their  desired  tariffs  giwen  by  t*, 
"rd 
t*o  (t*,  I
t"o)  respectively.  In  the  second  stage,  the  firns  simultaneously  announce
their  Iobbying  expenditures.  The subgame-perfect  Nash equilibrium,can  be
determined  by  worklng  backward.  First,  we determine  the  Nash equilibriurn
Iobbying  expenditures  giv.r  L*,  .rd  t"o.  Then,  using  the  expected  profits
of  firns  in  each  sector  consistent  with  these  lobbying  expenditures,  we
determine  the  Nash equilibrium  tariff  announcements.
Consider  the  subgarne  in  rghich the  desired  tariffs  of  the
iDport-compe ting  and exporting  firms  are  given  by  t", 
"rd 
t"o.  Assuming
that  the  firms  are  risk  neutral,  they  will  uake  lobbying  contributions  to
maximize  expected  profit.  A  t)Dical  firm  in  the  import-competing  sector
will  select  lobbying  expenditure  S  to  maximize
Efl*,  = dn*r(.*r) + (1-r) 
x 




equal  to  zero  yields  the -  dJ
xi
optimal  lobbying  contribution
L4I  s  -s  +(s[  (t-)-II  (t  )])r/2 *t 
*], 
xk  y  y'  xk-xl  xk-xo"
(24)
the  des  ired tariff
This  equation  reflects  the  pure  public  good nature  of  lobbying
contributions,  Contributions  by  any  firms  in  the  sector  yield  benefits
all  firns  by  increasing  the  ptobability  of  success  of  their  preferred
policy.  Each firn  is  willing  to  contribute  up  to  the  point  that  the
increase  in  expected  profit  at  the  margin  equals  one dollar.  There  is  a
one-to-one  trade-off  between  the  contributions  of  other  firrns  in  the
sector  and firn  1,  Since  all  firms  in  the  import-conpeting  seccot  are
id,entical,  the  total  lobbying  expenditure  by  the  sector  is12
S  --S  +iStI]  (t  )-II  (t  )l]1/2
x  y  -  y'xt'xl  ' 
xi'xo"
(25)
A  typical  f irrn
(t  ^),  select  S  to
xv  vl
in  the  exporting  sector  will,  given
naximize  expected  profits  given  by
En  = dII  (r  )
vj  vJ'  x1' + (1-d)II  .(r _) -  s . yt  xu  vt
(26)
This  yields  the  following  reactlon  function  of  the  exporting  sector
S  :  -  s  + {S tII (r  )
y  x  x'  yj'  xo'
-  II.(r  ")])t/' (27  )
S",  for  given  1eve1s Solving  for  the Nash  equilibrium  levels  of  S  and
'ta
"This  is  the  reaction  function  of  the  import-competing  sector  given  the
export  sector's  lobbying  expenditure  S
15^C  |  -i.,^^ ur  ux1  drru  LxO'  6!ver
AII  AII 
2
,  vi  xl
x  xo  xr 




s  i/f  r  \  : 
*i  Yj
v  xo  xr  lATt  + An _]2 r---xl 
,J
where  AII  :n  (r  )-I]  (t  )  and aII  -II  (r  )-n  (r  ).





Given  there  is  a  poliey  contest,  the  subgame  perfect  Nash  equiTibtiun
tariffs  of  the  import-compet  ing  firms  and  the  exporting  firms  wiTI  be  the
prohibitive  tariff  and  the  zero  tariff  respectively.
Proof
In  the  event  of  a  policy  contest,  with  tariff  annourrcements  of  t*o
and  t  _,  the  expected  profits  of  a  typical  import-competi-ng  and  exporting
!1
firm  (rearranging  equations  23 and  26)  are
EII  = dAII  +I  (r  )-slm
xI  x!  xi'  xo'
(30)
EII  = (l-d)An  +II  (t  )-sln yj  yj  yj'  x1'  y (3r)
AII
and
AII  +  AII
YJ
Assume  that  the  firms  in  the  two  sectors  announce  different  tariffs
L6(i.e.,  t  >  t  ).-'  Is  it  in  the  interests  of  the  firus  in  each sector  to
xL  x0
increase  or  decrease  their  tariffs?  Firms  in  the  tr{ro sectors  vill  select
their  desired  tariff  levels  to  maximize  theLr  expected  profits  given  the
tariff  lewel  proposed  by  the  other  sector.  For  an  imporr-cornpeting  firm
dEtr.r/d.*,  = (ddldt*1)All,,  *  d(fl*r/d.*r)  -  (ds*,/dt*r)/m  (32)
where  dll"r/dt*,  is  defined  in  equation  (1"9),  and dS*/dt"r  is  the  change in
the  aggregate  lobbying  expenditure  of  the  irqport-competing  firrns  in
Iesponse  to  an  increase  in  t*1.  Expanding  gi-wes
dEII  /dr  =  (  An  IaIi  +  an  l-3  l
xI  xl  xi 
' 
x!  yj'
(  IdII  ,/dr  I  [aII2 + 3An NI  + 2  (m-r)M2  I
x!  xL-  - 
xt  x!  yj  m  yj-
+ ldn ./dr -  J tan' 1!111  + ^II aII <91 I r  (33) '  yj'  xI'  ' 
xl'm'  xI  yl'In
As II*r(t*)  and IIr.,  (t*)  are  convex,  dEn" //dtxl  is  greater  th"n  z.ro.14  An
inerease  in  the  desired  tariff  will  increase  the  expected  profits  of  all
the  import-competing  firus.  Sirnilarly,  for  an exporting  firn
dEfi  ./dt  - = {  An  IAII  + Afl.]-3  ) yjx0yj-xlyj
|  [dr  /dt.]  [AII2.  + 34II  .NI . + z(*)u'.] -  yj'  x1-  '  yJ  xr  yj  n
+ ldr*r,/dr*1l  t^r'(+)  + ^r,..^ry.(+)l) ,  (34)
'-It 
should  be  noted  that  within  a  sector  all  firms  are  idencical  and  hence
desire  the  sane  tariff.
11, - 
If  both  II  and  II  are  convex,  rhen  (dII  /dr  )AII  +  (dJt  /dr  )AII  <  0
xi  YS  xl'  x0'  yJ  yl'  x0'  xi
and  (dil  /dx  )Lfi  +  (dn  ,/dt  )AII  >  0.
xl  xI  yJ  yj'  xl  xi
L7which  is  less  than  zero.  Consequently,  if  t*t  >  t*0,  the  Nash equilibriurn
involves  the  inport-competing  firrns  lobbying  fox  a  prohibitive  tariff  and
the  exporting  firrns  lobbying  for  a  zero  tariff.
What  lf  the  firurs  in  each  sector  select  the  same tariff
(i.e.,  t  :  t  :  t  )?  In  this  case  the  tariff  is  certain  and  the
x0  xl  12
profits  of  a  typical  imporr-compering  and exporting  firm  will  b"  tr*r(a*r)
and n.(t  ^)  respectively.  In  this  case will  it  be in  the  interests  of
9l  a2
firrns  in  either  sector  to  deviate  from  tsz?  lJe knor,r  from  above that  if  it
is  in  the  interests  of  flrrns  in  either  sector  to  deviate,  they  will  do  so
by  setting  either  a zero  or  prohibitive  tariff.
If  t-  -t_:  t  , setting  a prohibitive  uariff  will  change  the
x0  xI  t2
expected  profits  of  an import-competing  firm  by
att2 [aII  + aII  (m-1)  I
xl'  x!  vi'  m  "
xt  ,^-  ^-  '2
\arr 
_1- anr  ,/
vl
(35)
where in  this  case AII*I :  II*i(a*)  -  n"r(.*r)  and AII". :  n"r(tr)  -  Ily.(E_).
Setting  a  zero  tariff  wiII  change the  expected  profits  of  an exporting
firm  bv
dEII
alt2  fatt  + alt  (n-1)  I
yj-  tl  xi  n  '
(36)
"'  (on  + aII  )2
xi  vi'
where in  this  case M*r:  fl*r(a"r)  -  fl_.(O) and AII"r:  IIy.(O) -  n"r(a*r).
both  of  which  are  greater  than  zero-  Consequently,  firns  in  both  sectors
18will  find  it  in  their  interests  to  deviate  from  the  tariff.  The Nash
equilibriun  is  therefore  a  divisive  equilibrium  where  the  exporting  firns
Iobby  for  a  zero  tariff  and  the  import-competing  firms  lobby  for  a
prohibitive  tar i ff.
When  we add the  costs  of  coalition  building,  the  expected  profits  of
firms  in  each  sector  in  the  event  of  a  contest  are  given  by
m-1
AII-- f NI-  +  AI]"  (:--:)  I
EII".  =n.(o)  +  "r-  "r  Yj-m"-Flm  (37, x!  xr  (A[". + An'.)2
AII'2  taII'  + aII"  (n-1)  l
En"  = r.. (E_) *  -1:-'  ,r:--]=-{'  -  p 7,'I  (3q)
Yr  YJ  * 
(An"  +  A11" )2 
v
xi  vl
where  AII".: rr.(r ) - n  (0); arr'.  - rt (o) -u  (E).15
xi.  x!'  x'  xl' 
- '  yj  yJ  ''  yj'  x
IIL  The  Dynauric  Tariff  Equilibriurn
The  tariff  is  determined  by  a  political  process  that  involves  several-
staBes.  In  the  first  stage,  the  import-competing  firrns  decide  whether  to
enter  the  politicaL  process  and  lobby  for  a  tariff  (  denoted  Uy  c"t).  The
exporting  firrns  then  decide  lrhether  to  enter  the  political  process  to
counter  that  tariff.  If  the  exporting  firms  decide  to  enter  the  politlcal
arena,  the  prewiously  described  policy  contest  develops.  If  the  exporting
firns  choose  not  to  enter,  their  poLicy  preferences  do  not  come  into  play
and  the  import-competing  firms  get  thei,r  desired  tariff  unopposed  and
--Assuning 
that  the  fixed  coscs  are  equally  shared  between  all  firms  in
each sector -
l9incur  only  the  fixed  entry  cost  of  entering  the  political  process.
The  dynamics  of  the  model  are  driven  by  learning.  In  each  period  the
political  equilibriul  changes  because  import-competing  fiTms  learn  more
about  the  exporters'  critical  tariff.  A key  simplifying  assunption  is
that  politicians  and  individual  firrns  act  as  though  they  are  only
concerned  about  the  next  political  terrn  and  not  about  subsequent
elecLions.  In  other  words,  the  political  plocess  is  rnyopic  in  the  sense
that  politicians  and  firms  are  only  concerned  about  setting  tariffs  to
uaximize  profits  and  political  support  over  the  next  political  cycle  and
not  subsequent  terms.  While  this  assumption  greatLy  simpllfies  the
dynamics,  it  allovrs  for  more  complex  within-period  behavior.
Exporting  firms  will  pay  the  fixed  cost  and  enter  the  polltical
process  only  if  the  expected  profits  associated  wlth  doing  so  exceed  the
profits  when  they  do  not  contest  the  proposed  tariff  (t*1).  This
condition  is  reached  iff
II.(r*t)  <  II  (r)
vJxyjx
n-1
AII-- lAn-  +  AII"  (ij--:)  I
+  YJ-  Yi  xr'n  "
(AII". + A ".)2
v7
-F/n (3e)
Therefore,  there  exists  a  critical  tariff  t",  such  that  if  t*r  >  t*,  the
exporting  firms  will  contest  the  poLicy.  While  all  flrms  are  fully  aware
of  the  costs  of  organizing  firms  in  their  own  sector,  they  are  uncertain
about  the  costs  of  their  opponents.  Consequently,  the  import-conpeting
firns  are  uncertain  about  their  opponent,s  costs  and  hence  are  uncertain
about  the  critical  tarift  i,
While  the  import-conpeting  firms  don,t  know  t,  they  assrxne  that  it
20has  the  cumulative  probability distribution  O (t  ),  where
1x
01(t*)  :
wirh  dor(rx)/dtx  >  o  and  d2or<x*) /dt'  .  Q




for  t  >i
ldo.(r  )/dc ltEIr' - n  (r )l 1  x  xr  xi'x
+ [1 - o.(r )]tdn .(r )/dr l
indicating  that
the  tariff  at  a
(40  )
the  perce lved
non-decreasing
Now consider  the  actions  of  the  inport-competing  firns.  The
inport-competing  firms  select  a  tariff  to  maximize  expected  profits
Errll(t*) :  o1(r*)Err",  +  [l-@r(t*) ]rr_.  (rx)  -  F*/n . (  41)
This  expected  profit  function  is  displayed  in  Figure  2.  For  tx  <  0,  there
is  no  chance  that  the  exporting  firms  will-  contest  the  policy  and hence
the  profits  of  an  importing  competing  firrn  are  II*r(0).  For  0 <  a* a  E*,
there  is  a positive  probability  that  a  contest  will  occur.  The change in
expected  profits  resulting  from  an  increase  in  the  tariff  is  given  by
,^-l  ,. obrr  /cc  :
At  t  :  t,  the  probability  of  a
import-competing  firm  are  EII'
point  is  always  negative.  At  t
contest  is  one,  and  the
The  slope  of  the  profit
:  0,  a  tariff  increase
(42)
profits  of  an
function  at  this
will  increase
2Lexpected profits  if  Ido1(o)/dt"]  tEil,{,  -  II*!(o)l  + dli*i(0),/dr* > o  (rhis
will  always be the  case if  EII". > II".(O),  as drawn in  Figure  2).
If  the  inport-competing  firro  decides  to  enter  the  political  process
and lobby  for  a positive  tariff,  the  equilibriun  may  not  be static.  ln
each period  the  inporting  firm  gains  some information  about  the  exporting
firms'  costs  (and hence  the  critical  tariff)  fron  observing  the  exporting
firns'  reaction  to  the  tariff.  In  each period  in  which  the  exporting
firns  do not  contest  the  tariff,  the  import-coupeting  firms  revise  their
prior  probability  about  the  crirical  tariff.  This  nay  change che
equilibrium.  Eventually,  it  may be possible  that  the  tariff  exceed.s the
critical  level  and a  lobbying  contest  results.
(a)  Equilibrium  Tariff  in  the  pirst  period
In  the  first  period,  the  import-conpeting  firros  wlll  select  a  tariff
(tx  )  to  naxrmlze  expected  profits.  If  the  inport-competlng  firms
announce a positive  tariff,  it  rrill  not  be  less  than  tb,  where
fl.(tb)  :  EIII.  (tb)  -  EII" .  Furrhernore,  rhe  slope  of  rhe profit  function xi  x  xt'  x'  xi
b 
,  t"1,  that  naximizes ls  posLtj.ve  at  t  and  negatlve  at  tx.  The  tariff
expected  profits  must  lie  between  tb  and  E*.  Increasing  the  fixed.  cost  F
shifts  the  expected  profit  function  parallel  downward.  The  expected
profit  function  for  various  lewels  of  the  fixed  cost  are  displayed  in
Figure  2.  It  is  clear  frorn  Figure  2  that  there  are  two  possible
equilibriums  in  the  first  period.
(a.1)  t1  = O
x
If  the  inport-competing  firms  decide  to  enter  the  political  process,the  best  they  can  <io is  earn  n*r(t*r)  -  F*/m  in  the  first  period.
rf  F  > nlEut it"r;  - n  (0)1,  (for  example  F  :  F  ),  the fixed  costs are
xI'  x' 
--xi' 
x  xZ'
sufficiently  high  to  nake  it  unprofitable  to  enter  and  the  tariff  rernains
at  zero.
la.z)  C  E  E xx
1f  rhe  fixed  enrry  costs  are  below nl[EII1!(t"r) - II*,(0)J  (for
example,  F*:  F*r),  the  expected  profits  from  entry  are  greater  than  the
profits  of  not  entering  the  political  arena,  and the  import-conpeting
firms  will  lobby  for  rhe  tariff  t*1.
(b)  Equilibrtun  Tarlff  in  the  Second period
If  the  import-competing  firrns  win  a  tariff,  che exporring  firms  will
decide  whether  to  contest  the  policy,  rnindful  of  their  expected  profits  if
they  do contest.  Two cases  are  possible  and are  analyzed  in  turn.
(b.1)  Exporting  Firrns do nor  contest  the  Tariff  policy  (i.e.,  ."t  <  i  )
The fact  that  the  exporring  firns  do nor  enrer  rhe  pofiticlf 
"ori".",
yields  information  about  their  cosrs  and critical  tariff  (i  ).  The
import-competing  firns  now realize  ttrat  I  ties  above the  cirrent  cariff
This  alters  their  prior  beliefs  about  the  probability  of  a contest.  It  is
now knovm  that  t  €  [t',  t  l.  The probabilitv  of  a contest  becoues








where dor(t")/drx  > 0,  and d'o2(r*)/dr-  >  0.
The expected  profits  of  an  importing  conpeLing  firm  becone
EIIz!-O2(r*)E["r+[1  -  Or(rx)JII*r(t*) -  F*/n (44)
dEfi'  /dt  -  tl  -  o (r  )itdfl  (r  )/dt  ]
xi'  2'x"'  si'x"
+  [do-(r )/dr  ][Efi". -  n.(r  )]  (4s)
As  there  is  no  chance  of  a  contest  for  t  <  t"r,  the  expected  profit
function  consists  of  the  function  n  (t  > rn  -  that  point.  For  t  >  t*1,
there  is  a probability  the  export  firms  rtrill  contesc.  At  t  = E ,  there
wiII  be  a  policy  contest  so,  EIIz. :  EII". and the  slope  of  the  expected
profit  function  is  negative-  However, as II".  (t*)  )  EIIC.  at  t*:  t"1,  the
direction  of  the  change in  expected  profits  due to  an  increase  in  the
tariff  is  uncertain.
There  ate  two  possible  outcomes  if  the  exporting  firros  do  not  contest
the  policy.
qi;  t2  :  t"1
If  dEII2i/dt*  <  0  at  t*:  t"1,  the  equilibriurn  tariff  will  not  change.
As  it  is  not  in  the  interests  for  either  the  import-cox0peting  firms  to
Lobby  for  a  higher  tariff,  or  the  exporting  firms  to  contest  the  policy,
the  tariff  remains  at  t"1.
24(ii)  12 :  rnt >  t"t
If  dEfl'z./dt* >  O at  t*:  tnt,  th.  inport-competing  firns  will  lobby
for  a higher  tariff.  In  this  case  the  tariff  (t*2)  that  rnaximizes
expected profits  will  lie  strictly  between t'1  and t*.  This  equilibriurn
is  displayed  in  Figure  3.  So long  as  t*2 <  i*,  tfr.  exporting  firrns  will
not  contest  the  policy  and  the  process  is  repeated.
(b.2)  Export  FLrm Contests  the  Tariff  Policy  (i.e.,  i  t  r*t)
If  the  initial  equilibrium  rariff  exceed.s the  cri-itca1  rariff,  the
exporting  firms  will  contest  the  policy.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  contes!
will  degenerate  into  one  in  which  the  exporting  firms  dernand  a  zero  tariff
and  the  import-conpeting  firms  demand a prohibitive  tariff.  Because of
the  all-or-nothing  nature  of  the  coDtest,  the  tariff  policy  will  either  be
free  trade  (t*:0)  or  prohibirion  frorn  trade  {t*-E*)  wittr  the  following
Drobabilities
AII"
Prtt -0) :  Yr
*  an"  + an"
x  !  vi
(45  )
AiI'
E)rtr -;  I:  *i (47  )
aII"  + AII"
YJ
Therefore,  if  there  is  a  liberal  izatiorr,  it  will  be  a  large
Iiberalization.  Once  the  agents  favoring  a  free  trade  policy  contest  the
tariff,  they  find  it  in  their  interest  to  lobby  for  a  conpleteliberalization.  Curiously  though,  the  act  of  contesting  the  tari.ff  policy
rnay have  the  perverse  result  of  pushing  the  country  toward  autarky.
Efforts  to  liberalize  x0ay be  counterproductive  if  those  supporting  the
tariff  have sufficient  political  power.
IV.  Concluding  Remarks
The  prirnary  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  shon  that  there  is  a
dynanic  political  process  behind  protection  and  liberalizations  that  is
consistent  with  the  stylized  facts  in  tariff-settlng  behavior.  In  nany
developing  countries,  we  often  observe  periods  of  gradually  increasing
protection  followed  by  liberal  lzations  ,  which  are,  in  turn,  reversed  by
further  periods  of  increaslng  protection.  Without  altering  the  structure
of  the  economy  or  the  composition  of  coalitions,  r,re find  that  increasing
Ievels  of  protection  may yield  a  liberalization.  Uncertainty  about  the
exporting  sector's  cost  of  coalition  fornation  generates  a  political
outcome  in  which  the  tariff  increases  over  time  until  it  is  either
reversed  by  a  liberalization  or  pushed  further  toward  autar\r,
Because  liberalizations  are  modeled  as  the  outcome  of  an  endogenous
political  process-and  are  not  imposed  on  a  country  from  external  fotces-
the  ctedibility  of  any  trade  liberalization  is  entirely  dependent  on  the
relative  strength  of  the  import-compet  ing  and  exporting  sectors  and  on  the
uncertainty  remaining  about  the  export  sector,s  cost  of  coalition
building.  If  uncertainty  about  the  costs  of  coaLition  building
remain-because  of  changes  in  demand  of  production  structure,  for
example-then  a  tariff  cycle  will  perpetuate.References
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